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The perceived brightness of an object does not correspond in a 
simple way with its luminance, and two objects of equal lumi-
nance can appear to have different levels of brightness if they 
are observed in different contexts. Such simultaneous bright-
ness contrast (SBC) is observed, for example, when a gray 
circle appears brighter against a dark background than against 
a light background (Fig. 1a). Similarly, spatially distinct ele-
ments of a visual scene can induce an illusory percept of lumi-
nance contours if the organization of those elements induces 
the visual system to extrapolate the presence of an occluding 
surface (Fig. 1b), as in the Kanizsa triangle illusion (Kanizsa, 
1979).
These contextual illusions may depend on high-level infer-
ential processes (Helmholtz, 1867; Williams, McCoy, & 
Purves, 1998). Alternatively, they may be mediated by low-
level mechanisms operating at the earliest stages of visual pro-
cessing (Mueller, 1842; Paradiso & Nakayama, 1991). These 
two accounts predict different illusory perception when aware-
ness of the context is disrupted. Specifically, if high-level 
inferential mechanisms are involved, illusory brightness per-
ception must require awareness of the context. Conversely, 
if low-level mechanisms dominate, these illusions would per-
sist even without contextual awareness. These predictions can 
help draw a distinction between context-dependent perceptual 
phenomena that do and do not depend on awareness of the 
context. Such a distinction would offer the opportunity to 
address a fundamental question of much wider interest: What 
is consciousness for?
In the experiments reported here, we used a novel dichoptic 
masking technique to selectively render contextual parts of the 
stimulus invisible. Through a mirror stereoscope, participants 
viewed an SBC illusion or a Kanizsa triangle (Fig. 1, left) with 
one eye while viewing brightly colored flashing patterns 
(Fig. 1, right) with the other eye. These flashing patterns 
almost entirely overlapped the retinotopic location of the stim-
ulus in the other eye, sparing only the locations of the illusory 
percept. This composite stimulus resulted in stable and selec-
tive suppression of the background context through continu-
ous flash suppression (CFS; Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005), but left 
the critical portion of the stimuli phenomenally accessible to 
consciousness for behavioral report.
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Abstract
The perception of even the most elementary features of the visual environment depends strongly on their spatial context. In 
the study reported here, we asked at what level of abstraction such effects require conscious processing of the context. We 
compared two visual illusions that alter subjective judgments of brightness: the simultaneous brightness contrast illusion, in 
which two circles of identical physical brightness appear different because of different surround luminance, and the Kanizsa 
triangle illusion, which occurs when the visual system extrapolates a surface without actual physical stimulation. We used a novel 
interocular masking technique that allowed us to selectively render only the context invisible. Simultaneous brightness contrast 
persisted even when the surround was masked from awareness. In contrast, participants did not experience illusory contours 
when the inducing context was masked. Our findings show that invisible context is resolvable by low-level processes involved 
in surface-brightness perception, but not by high-level processes that assign surface borders through perceptual completion.
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General Method
Participants
Twenty-two healthy, right-handed volunteers (9 male and 13 
female; age range = 21–35 years) with normal or corrected-to-
normal vision participated in this study. Ten volunteers took 
part in the first experiment, 5 in the second experiment, and 7 
in the third experiment. All experiments were undertaken with 
the consent of the participants and approval of the local ethics 
committee.
Apparatus
Stimuli were generated using the Cogent Graphics toolbox 
(Laboratory of Neurobiology, University College London, 
London, England) for MATLAB 7.2.0 (The MathWorks, 
Natick, MA) and were presented in a dark room on a gamma-
corrected CRT display. The display had a resolution of 640 × 
480 pixels in Experiments 1 and 2 and of 800 × 600 pixels in 
Experiment 3, and it had a refresh rate of 100 Hz in Experi-
ments 1 and 2 and of 60 Hz in Experiment 3. With the 
exception of the stimuli in the first task of Experiment 1, all 
stimuli were viewed through a mirror stereoscope. Head and 
chin rests were used in all tasks to ensure a consistent viewing 
distance of 66 cm. Participants made responses using a com-
puter keyboard.
Experiment 1: SBC Under  
Dichoptic Masking
In Experiment 1, participants were asked to judge which of 
two gray circles appeared brighter in three different tasks.
Task 1: canceling brightness differences
In the first task, each participant quantified the magnitude of 
the SBC illusion.
Stimuli. Stimuli were presented centrally within a uniform 
gray border (background luminance = 65 cd/m2) nested within 
a tile-frame surround (11.77° visual angle). Each stimulus 
consisted of two gray circles (diameter = 1.19°), one on the 
left side and one on the right side of a sinusoidal luminance 
gradient (width = 5.95°). One side of this gradient was black, 
and the other was white; a smooth transition from black to 
white in the center had a spatial frequency of 0.2 cycles per 
degree. The right/left position of the black and white sides of 
the gradient was counterbalanced across trials. One gray circle 
was located on the left side of the gradient and was fixed at 
background luminance, and the other gray circle was on the 
right and was assigned a random luminance value at the start 
of each trial.
Procedure. Each participant viewed the SBC stimulus binoc-
ularly. Participants were asked to use the up and down arrow 
keys on the keyboard to adjust the brightness of the test circle 
on the right to match the brightness of the reference circle on 
the left. When participants perceived the brightness of the two 
circles to be equal, they pressed the space bar to end the trial. 
Each participant received two blocks of six trials. Each partici-
pants’ mean values for the adjusted luminance of the test circle 
when it was located on the bright side and when it was located 
on the dark side were subsequently used in the next two phases 
of Experiment 1.
Task 2: judging brightness differences
Having established the magnitude of the SBC illusion induced 
by our stimuli in the first task, we proceeded to investigate 
whether the illusion persisted when the inducing context was 
rendered invisible by dichoptic masking using CFS.
Stimuli. The stimuli for the left and right eyes were presented 
in a split-screen arrangement with an 8.88° horizontal dis-
placement from the center of the screen. Each stimulus was 
viewed with a separate eye through a mirror stereoscope. To 
Suppressed Eye Dominant Eyea
b Suppressed Eye Dominant Eye
Fig. 1. Stimuli and masks used in (a) Experiment 1 and (b) Experiment 3. For 
each experiment, an example stimulus is shown on the left, and a continuous 
flash suppression (CFS) mask is shown on the right. Experiment 1 utilized the 
simultaneous brightness contrast illusion. The suppressed eye was shown two 
gray circles that were physically identical but appeared different in luminance 
because of the context. The CFS mask covered most of the illusion stimulus 
except for two “holes” (highlighted here by arrows) that coincided with 
the two gray circles. Experiment 3 utilized the Kanizsa triangle illusion. The 
suppressed eye was shown four inducer elements, three of which created the 
illusory impression of a triangle. In the selective-mask condition (illustrated 
here), four circular CFS masks covered the inducers in the illusion stimulus; in 
the invisible condition, a single CFS mask covered the entire stimulus.
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guide binocular fusion, we surrounded each stimulus with the 
same complex tile pattern used in the first task. Although this 
frame was identical for the two eyes, the stimuli presented to 
them differed: One eye was presented with a CFS mask that 
allowed for controlled suppression of the SBC stimulus, which 
was presented to the other eye (Fig. 1a).
The CFS mask consisted of randomly positioned and scaled 
colored rectangles and ellipses, which were regenerated at a 
rate of approximately 12 Hz, within a square 6.83° wide. A 
fixation cross was presented in the center of the CFS stimulus, 
with two gray circles (holes) on either side. These circles 
(background luminance, diameter = 1.08°) were placed so that 
the flashing colors of the CFS stimulus would not mask the 
test circles in the SBC stimulus.
The SBC stimulus consisted of two gray test circles, which 
participants in different conditions perceived to have different 
luminance, depending on the circles’ actual luminance and 
the luminance of the background against which they were 
presented.
In the illusory-difference condition, the two test circles 
were both set to background luminance and were presented 
against a sinusoidal luminance background, as in the first task. 
The background was again configured so that one test circle 
was on the bright side, and the other was on the dark side. In 
the real-difference condition, the two circles were of different 
luminance and were presented against a gray square of back-
ground luminance. The luminance values for these test circles 
were derived from the first task and thus were specific to each 
participant.
Procedure. Participants began each trial by pressing the space 
bar. They were instructed to fixate on a centrally presented cross 
throughout each trial, which lasted 1,200 ms. The CFS stimulus 
was presented to one eye for the full duration of the trial. The 
other eye received the test image for the first 1,000 ms and a 
CFS stimulus for the last 200 ms to prevent afterimages of the 
suppressed image. After completing each trial, participants were 
asked to report whether the left or the right circle was brighter (a 
two-alternative, forced-choice task). They were then asked 
whether the suppressed stimulus background was visible or 
invisible; they were instructed to report that the stimulus back-
ground was visible even if they saw only a small part of it for a 
short time. Responses to both questions were made using the 
left and right arrow keys on the keyboard.
Each participant completed 12 blocks of 16 trials, for a total 
of 96 trials in each condition. The suppressed eye, the condi-
tion, and the left/right luminance arrangement of the back-
ground in the illusory-difference condition and the circles in 
the real-difference condition were selected randomly for each 
trial but ultimately counterbalanced over each block.
Task 3: discriminating the background
To confirm that participants’ reports that the background was 
invisible were really indicative of an absence of accessible 
information, we asked participants in a separate session to 
make perceptual judgments about the suppressed portion of 
the SBC stimulus (i.e., the background). Instead of judging 
which circle was brighter, as in the previous task, partici-
pants judged which side of the SBC stimulus was darker. To 
reduce possible cues, we configured all SBC stimuli for this 
task in such a way that the illusion was perceptually canceled 
for each participant. That is, two circles of different lumi-
nance, derived for each individual from the first task, were 
presented against the sinusoidal luminance gradient, with 
the circle on the dark side being darker than the circle on the 
bright side. In all other respects, the procedure was the same 
as in the second task.
Results
In Task 2, the background was classed as invisible on an 
average of 85% of trials in both the real-difference and 
the illusory-difference conditions. Only these trials were 
included in the analysis to preclude the possibility that trials 
in which part of the background was seen could have con-
taminated the results (the proportion of trials in which the 
background was visible was very low for most participants, 
and this precluded a reliable estimate of performance on such 
trials).
In the real-difference condition, participants’ ability to 
distinguish which circle appeared brighter through the CFS 
holes was significantly better than chance (M = .91 correct 
responses), t(9) = 16.45, p < .001 (Fig. 2a). In the illusory-
difference condition, perceptions that the disk on the dark side 
of the stimulus was brighter than the disk on the light side 
were also above chance frequency (M = .74), t(9) = 3.85, p = 
.004 (Fig. 2a). Thus, an invisible variation in background 
luminance created illusory brightness differences in a visible 
stimulus that were comparable with physical brightness 
differences.
It is important to note that in Task 3, participants could not 
make accurate perceptual judgments about the background 
(M = .51 correct responses), t(9) = 0.76, p = .466, and this 
confirms that participants were not aware of the invisible con-
text (for this task, the background was classed as invisible in 
86% of trials). Thus, brightness judgments, although critically 
dependent on spatial context, do not rely on awareness of that 
context.
The results of Experiment 1 suggested that brightness per-
ception in SBC must arise before conscious awareness. SBC 
exhibits no interocular transfer (Alpern, 1963), and this fact 
constrains the locus of SBC to monocular neuronal popula-
tions. This observation is consistent with low-level theories of 
brightness perception that posit a reliance on contrast mecha-
nisms at the border between a figure and a background, and 
this contrast is propagated throughout the figural region by a 
filling-in mechanism (Paradiso & Nakayama, 1991). We tested 
these theories in Experiment 2 using our dichoptic CFS mask-
ing procedure.
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Experiment 2: Border Manipulation
Method
Starting with the same experimental configuration as in the 
illusory-difference condition of Experiment 1, we varied the 
size of the circles (1.19°, 1.59°, 1.99°, 2.39°, and 2.78°) in the 
SBC stimuli but kept the size of the holes constant (1.08°) in 
the CFS stimulus. To keep the ratio of contextual background 
to test circle constant, we also varied the size of the back-
ground (3.58°, 4.76°, 5.95°, 7.13°, and 8.30°, respectively) in 
the SBC stimuli, but we kept the size of the CFS stimulus 
mask and the tile frame constant (8.59° and 11.77°, respec-
tively; Fig. 2b). The CFS mask was presented to one eye, 
and the SBC stimulus was presented to the other, as in 
Experiment 1. Participants were asked to judge which circle 
was brighter in two blocks of 16 trials for each circle size.
Results
There was no significant difference in the percentage of trials 
on which the background was classed as invisible as a function 
of circle size—1.19°: 88% invisible; 1.59°: 78% invisible; 
1.99°: = 80% invisible; 2.39°: 74% invisible; and 2.78°: 74% 
invisible, F(4, 20) = 1.46, p = .25. As in Experiment 1, we 
included only these trials in further analysis. We found that 
illusory perception decreased significantly, F(4, 20) = 4.435,
p = .01, with increasing circle size (Fig. 2b), which indicates 
that mechanisms at the border are indeed important for this 
illusion.
Experiment 3: Kanizsa Triangle Under 
Dichoptic Masking
At what level of abstraction is consciousness necessary for 
visual processing of spatial context? In Experiment 3, we used 
our dichoptic masking procedure to test whether a presumably 
high-level process, the perception of illusory contours through 
amodal completion (a Kanizsa triangle), could also occur 
without contextual awareness. We examined whether percep-
tion of illusory contours persisted when the inducing stimulus 
elements were masked from awareness through CFS.
Method
Stimuli. Kanizsa triangle stimuli were generated by placing 
four inducer elements in a square configuration (width = 
9.16°) on a black background (Fig. 1b). In order to facilitate 
masking of these elements by CFS, we rendered them as a 
Gaussian luminance profile (SD = 0.92°) to avoid sharp edges. 
A black wedge was removed from each of these inducer ele-
ments. Two of these wedges measured 45°; a third wedge mea-
sured 90°. The wedges extended to the edge of their respective 
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Fig. 2. Mean proportion of correct responses in (a) Experiment 1 and (b) Experiment 2. In Task 2 of Experiment 1, participants judged 
which disk appeared brighter. In the real-difference condition, the two disks differed in physical brightness. In the illusory-difference 
condition, the two disks were the same physical brightness, and responses were judged correct if participants reported that the disk on 
the dark side of the stimulus was brighter than the disk on the light side. In Task 3, participants judged which side of the background was 
darker. The icons below the graph depict the stimuli presented to the suppressed eye. The graph in (b) shows the proportion of trials in 
Experiment 2 in which participants experienced simultaneous brightness contrast (i.e., they perceived the disk on the dark background 
as brighter than the disk on the light background) as a function of disk size. The icons below the graph depict the stimuli presented to 
the suppressed eye. The holes through which the gray circles appeared in the masking stimulus (not pictured) remained a constant size 
(smaller than the smallest disk). Error bars indicate 1 SEM.
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inducers, and were positioned such that they appeared to form 
the apexes of a right triangle. The wedge that measured 90° 
could be either in the bottom left or the bottom right inducer. 
Finally, a fourth element, opposite the hypotenuse of the illu-
sory triangle, was a distractor inducer that was not part of the 
triangle. In this element, the wedge measured 45° but did not 
extend to the edge of the inducer. Thus, the combination of 
elements determined whether the Kanizsa triangle was per-
ceived to be facing to the left or to the right.
A white fixation dot was presented 1.37° above the center 
of the square. We located the fixation point here in order to 
facilitate the perception of illusory contours, which has been 
shown to be stronger in the lower than in the upper visual field 
(Rubin, Nakayama, & Shapley, 1996). Finally, we also gener-
ated a stimulus that included only the Gaussian luminance pro-
files without the black wedges. All of these stimuli were 
presented within a tile frame similar to the one used in the 
other experiments but subtending 15.58° of visual angle.
As in the other experiments, the CFS mask itself was a 
Mondrian-like pattern of colored, randomly positioned and 
scaled geometric shapes that was regenerated at 10 Hz. In the 
selective-mask condition, we masked the four inducers but left 
visible the region that would be traversed by the sides of the 
illusory triangle (and would potentially be accessible to con-
scious awareness): The CFS mask was viewed only through 
circular apertures (diameter = 3.67°) that overlapped the 
inducers. In the invisible-stimulus condition, the CFS mask 
was 9.16° wide and thus exactly covered the area of the 
Kanizsa stimulus. In the visible condition, the stimulus 
appeared unmasked. As in the other experiments, the images 
for the left and right eye were presented in a split-screen 
arrangement with a 8.25° horizontal displacement from the 
center of the screen.
Procedure. At the start of every trial, participants were pre-
sented with a 200-ms blank stimulus, in which only the tile 
frame, black square, and fixation dot were visible. Then, one 
eye was presented with the Kanizsa triangle stimulus for 
200 ms, followed by 100 ms of the stimulus containing only 
the Gaussian luminance profiles without the black wedges. We 
chose a short stimulus duration to ensure that the CFS mask 
adequately masked the illusion stimulus. However, we 
observed comparable results in pilot experiments with longer 
stimulus durations. As one eye viewed the Kanizsa triangle, 
the opposite eye was presented with the blank stimulus (visi-
ble condition), a CFS mask covering the entire Kanizsa stimu-
lus (invisible condition), or the mask with four circular 
apertures covering the inducers only (selective-mask condi-
tion). Subsequently, the display for both eyes reverted back to 
the blank stimulus, and participants were asked to indicate 
using the left or right arrow keys whether they saw the Kanizsa 
triangle pointing to the left or to the right (a two-alternative, 
forced-choice task).
Participants performed 160 trials for each of the three con-
ditions. There were equal numbers of trials with the triangle 
pointing left or right. The three conditions and two triangle 
orientations were shown in a pseudorandomized, counterbal-
anced order. Every 24 trials, there was a rest break, which par-
ticipants terminated manually by pressing a key.
Results
In the visible condition, all participants found the task easy: Per-
formance was significantly above chance (M = .97 correct 
responses), t(6) = 82.44, p < .001. This high level of perfor-
mance despite the presence of a distractor inducer shows that 
the brief stimulus duration was sufficient for a representation of 
the illusory contour to form. If the illusion also persisted with-
out awareness of the inducers, participants’ performance should 
have been above chance in the selective-mask condition as well. 
However, as Figure 3 shows, this was not the case (M = .51 cor-
rect responses), t(6) = 0.50, p = .638, and performance in 
this condition was no different from performance when the 
entire stimulus was masked (invisible condition), paired t test, 
t(6) = –1.38, p = .218. Thus, the perception of illusory contours 
requires awareness of the inducing elements.
Discussion
In the series of experiments reported here, we combined a 
novel selective-masking technique with two contextual visual 
illusions that modulated subjective judgments of brightness. 
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Fig. 3. Mean proportion of correct responses in Experiment 3 as a function 
of condition. The three conditions, which are illustrated by the icons below 
the graph, all involved a Kanizsa triangle stimulus. In the visible condition, the 
stimulus was not masked. In the selective-mask and invisible conditions, a 
continuous flash suppression mask was presented in two different ways. Error 
bars indicate 1 SEM.
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We examined whether conscious processing of spatial context 
was necessary for these illusions to occur.
In Experiment 1, we found that SBC persisted even though 
the spatial context inducing the illusion was not consciously 
perceived. The high-contrast dynamic noise patterns sup-
pressed the background region that surrounded two physically 
identical target circles. These target circles, which were selec-
tively visible through the interocular mask, appeared different 
in brightness (Task 2) as if there were a real physical differ-
ence between the two targets (such as in Task 1). The effect 
was somewhat weaker for the illusory-difference than for the 
real-difference condition, a pattern consistent with previous 
findings that rendering a stimulus invisible is equivalent 
to reducing its luminance contrast (Blake, Tadin, Sobel, 
Raissian, & Chong, 2006).
In Experiment 2, we further tested whether this brightness 
illusion was mediated by local low-level mechanisms, in 
which the perceived brightness spreads from the luminance 
boundaries throughout the stimulus. We parametrically varied 
the size of the two target circles (and the surrounding back-
grounds) but kept constant the size of the holes in the CFS 
mask through which participants viewed the illusion. This 
effectively changed the distance from the conscious viewing 
area to the luminance edges of the targets. The magnitude of 
the SBC depended on the size of the circles, a finding demon-
strating that the illusion is indeed mediated by processes near 
the luminance border. Because previous work has shown that 
SBC is also a purely monocular process (Alpern, 1963), the 
neural basis of the illusion must be in the early stages of the 
visual pathway: the retinal ganglion cells, the lateral genicu-
late nucleus, or the monocular population of neurons in pri-
mary visual cortex. It is important to note that the fact that 
SBC occurs in monocular neurons would not necessarily rule 
out the possibility that it requires consciousness. Our findings 
therefore demonstrate that SBC is a low-level process and that 
it does not rely on awareness of the context.
Perception of illusory contours is also associated with the 
subjective experience of brightness change. It is conceivable 
that perception of illusory contours may involve high-level 
processing because the visual system should infer the presence 
of an occluding surface from the organization of simple visual 
features in the background. This may require an abstract con-
cept of depth that may not arise without conscious analysis of 
the visual scene and is probably learned through experience 
with the environment (Walk, 1966). In Experiment 3, we 
tested whether visible Kanizsa inducers were necessary for the 
perception of illusory contours.
When not viewing stimuli through a CFS mask, partici-
pants found it easy to discriminate the shape of an illusory 
Kanizsa triangle; however, when the elements of the stimulus 
inducing the illusion were masked from awareness, behavioral 
performance dropped to chance levels—comparable to levels 
observed when the entire stimulus was masked—confirming 
that awareness of inducers was necessary for perception of 
illusory contours. Consistent with this assertion, findings of 
other studies have shown that patients deprived of visual expe-
rience from an early age often do not experience this illusion 
when their vision is restored in later life (Fine et al., 2003).
It has been suggested that illusory contours are mediated by 
binocular neurons (Paradiso, Shimojo, & Nakayama, 1989), a 
suggestion that places this effect at a higher stage of process-
ing than the monocular mechanisms of brightness perception 
(Alpern, 1963; Anderson, Dakin, & Rees, 2009). Indeed, neu-
rons responsive to illusory contour have been found in area V2 
(von der Heydt, Peterhans, & Baumgartner, 1984). However, 
neural correlates of illusory contours induced by abutting lines 
have also been reported for regions as early as the primary 
visual cortex (Montaser-Kouhsari, Landy, Heeger, & Larsson, 
2007; Ramsden, Hung, & Roe, 2001). This raises the possibil-
ity that the two types of brightness illusions—dependent on 
and independent from awareness of context—may not differ in 
their anatomical locus in the visual hierarchy. That is, they 
may arise in overlapping neuronal populations within V1, but 
illusory contours may, for example, involve predictive reen-
trant feedback from higher levels (Di Lollo, Enns, & Rensink, 
2000; Lamme, 2003; Pascual-Leone & Walsh, 2001). In that 
view, the neural correlates of consciousness depend more on 
the process than on the anatomy involved in perception.
Taken together, our data show that perceived brightness can 
be influenced by invisible variations in background luminance 
and that such context-dependent brightness perception relies 
on low-level mechanisms at stimulus borders. But such influ-
ence of invisible contexts on conscious perception does not 
extend to all aspects of brightness perception, as the percep-
tion of illusory luminance contours requires contextual aware-
ness. The results of these experiments support low-level 
theories of brightness perception and indicate that the percep-
tual extrapolation of global form invokes high-level inferential 
processes. These findings also extend the general claim— 
previously restricted to orientation perception (Clifford & 
Harris, 2005)—that unconscious context can modulate con-
scious perception to the realm of brightness perception. 
Finally, our experimental procedure of partial CFS provides a 
new technique with which the role of conscious perception in 
contextual visual processing can be investigated.
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